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Abstract
We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many
types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and non-
wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following eﬃciency property: no strategy-
proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise
use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred accep-
tance. This result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed
in real-life markets as well as our practice in Market Design that separately treats each market
for its design.
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1 Introduction
We have recently witnessed economists’ discovery and design of real-life matching markets such as
school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003) and organ exchanges (Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver,
2004; Ergin, So¨nmez, and U¨nver, 2014). In such a market one type of indivisible good, or object
for short, is allocated to agents who demand one unit when monetary transfers are not allowed
(Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979).
We often deal with multiple types of objects at the same time — what we call a multiple-type
(matching) market. People simultaneously participate in multiple markets, each of which deals
with a diﬀerent type of commodity. Examples are abundant: Many families live in public housing
and have children who go to school — one type of object is public housing and another is a seat in a
school;1 Teaching courses and administrative tasks are assigned to faculty members in universities
where one type of object is courses and another is administrative tasks; About 80 % of pancreas
patients in Japan also need a kidney transplant due to chronic kidney disease where one type of
object is the pancreas and another the kidney.2 Furthermore, a dynamic matching market is a
special class of multiple-type markets where people dynamically participate in one market multiple
times (Kurino, 2014). This is because the objects consumed in two distinct dates are considered
to be diﬀerent object types. For example, college students take part in the annual assignment
of dormitory rooms; Families with several children participate in a school choice program or a
daycare assignment program at diﬀerent times when each of their children enters the school (Dur,
2012; Kennes, Monte, and Tumennasan, 2014); Teachers in public schools move to diﬀerent schools
through annual assignment procedures (Bloch and Cantala, 2013).
In this paper, we focus on a multiple-type market. Each agent has a separable preference,
where a preference over bundles is separable if there is a list of preferences over each single-type
market such that if two bundles x and y are diﬀerent in only t-th type, then the evaluation between
x and y coincides with the evaluation of t-th types xt and yt according to the preference over the
t-th market objects.3
One important observation is that in most cases, if not all, assignment procedures for diﬀerent
types of objects are operated by diﬀerent government authorities, and each procedure is inde-
pendent from the other.4 Corresponding to this practice in real-life markets, the Market Design
literature treats each market independently and then considers the design of stratetgy-proof and
1The percentage of the population living in public housing is about 10 to 35 in many countries. For
example, Whitehead and Scanlon (2007) report that the percentages in European countries around 2000
are 35 in the Netherlands, 25 in Austria, 21 in Denmark, 20 in Sweden, 18 in England, 17 in France,
8 in Ireland, 6 in Germany, and 4 in Hungary. Moreover, the percentages are 30 in Hong Kong
and 9.9 in Japan (The webpages are http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/en/public-housing/index.html and
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jyutaku/2008/10 3.htm. The webs were accessed on December 18, 2013.) This sug-
gests that about the same percentage of families with children would participate in two types of markets - public
housing assignment and school choice programs.
2For example see the Handbook of The Japan Society for Transplantation (2013).
3A model with single-type objects is a special case of ours. Although our main focus is a multiple-type model,
all of our results remain true in single-type models.
4For example, in the City of Boston, the school choice assignment is operated by Boston Public Schools, while
the public housing assignment is controlled by the Boston Housing Authority.
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Table 1: An example of ineﬃciency
Agent 1 Agent 2
R1 R11 R
2
1 R2 R
1
2 R
2
2
(a, c) a c (a, c) a c
(b, c) b d (a, d) b d
(a, d) (b, c)
(b, d) (b, d)
...
...
Note: Agent i’s preference for bundles is denoted by Ri while that for type-t objects is by Rti. For example, agent
1 prefers bundle (a, c) to (b, c) to (a, d), ... , and she prefers a to b for type 1 while she does c to d.
Pareto eﬃcient (or at least non-wasteful) rules for only one type of market.5 However, such inde-
pendent operation of diﬀerent markets leads to ineﬃciency when we take all types of markets into
account.
To illustrate this point, suppose that there are two agents and two types of objects. We have
two objects a, b for type t = 1 market, and two objects c, d for type t = 2 market. Preferences of
agents 1 and 2 are given by Table 1. Now, let us consider the underlined allocation in this table
where agent 1 receives (a, d) and agent 2 gets (b, c). In other words, for type t = 1 the allocation
prescribes (1, 2; a, b), while for type t = 2 it does (1, 2; d, c). Note that within each type market
the allocations (1, 2; a, b) and (1, 2; d, c) are Pareto eﬃcient. However, by swapping their bundles
both agents are made better oﬀ. This means that the original allocation is not Pareto eﬃcient,
although its allocation for each type is Pareto eﬃcient. One lesson from this example is that an
allocation procedure that uses a Pareto eﬃcient rule for each type might result in an ineﬃcient
allocation.6
One of the most serious diﬃculties pertaining to the multiple-type market is that the combi-
nation of strategy-proofness and Pareto eﬃciency essentially results in a serial dictatorship rule
in which each agent chooses her assignment one by one according to an exogenously fixed priority
order (Monte and Tumennasan, 2013).7 However, such a rule is against the independent operation
of markets in real life and is extremely unfair.8
With this diﬃculty, we take a natural research direction of looking for a plausible rule by
5Under a non-wasteful allocation (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999), if some object is preferred to the assigned one
for an agent, it is fully assigned up to its quota. Thus, non-wastefulness is an eﬃciency axiom weaker than Pareto
eﬃciency. Note that non-wastefulness is defined only for single-type markets. The lack of a natural second-best
eﬃciency notion in a multiple-type market is another motivation of the current paper.
6More specifically, this is a Pareto ineﬃcient allocation although it is reached by the market-wise serial dicta-
torship rule which is strategy-proof and Pareto eﬃcient in each type market. Agent 1 is the dictator of the first
market while agent 2 is the dictator of the second market.
7Rigorously speaking, Monte and Tumennasan’s (2013) model is not a special case of ours due to the diﬀerence
in preference domains (See Assumption 2 and footnote 17). They prove that if a rule is strategy-proof, Pareto
eﬃcient and non-bossy, then it is a sequential dictatorship rule that is a variant of the serial dictatorship rule.
8Consider the environment with homogeneous preferences of agents and unit quotas of objects. In the “full”
serial dictatorship (SD) rule, the highest-priority agent receives her favorite objects from all types, and is envied by
all agents in each type. However, we can mitigate the unfairness with a “market-wise” serial dictatorship (SD) rule
where a priority is defined for each type, and the highest-priority agent in a type is diﬀerent from those in the other
markets. In this case for each agent there is only one type market for which she is envied by all agents. Although
it is Pareto ineﬃcient, the market-wise SD rule to a large extent remedies the unfair feature of the full SD rule.
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relaxing Pareto eﬃciency while keeping strategy-proofness. That is, we search for “second-best
(eﬃcient) incentive compatible” rules. To be precise, we call a rule second-best incentive compatible
if the rule is itself strategy-proof, and is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rule. It
is a quite natural second-best eﬃciency concept as far as we are concerned with strategy-proofness
since the notion is a straightforward adaptation of the Pareto criterion for the class of strategy-proof
rules. This paper provides a simple and practical suﬃcient condition for the second-best incentive
compatibility.
To state our main result, it is worth noting that there is a very simple way to construct a
strategy-proof rule in a multiple-type market. Namely, we first consider an independent rule which
applies a single-type rule in each market, and then consider only strategy-proof single-type rules for
an independent rule. This is made possible due to the separability of preferences. Based on this,
our main result (Theorem 1) is the following: An independent rule obtained by the market-wise
application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful single-type rules is second-best incentive compatible.
Now, let us explain the economic implications of Theorem 1. Inspired by Gale’s top trading
cycles (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) and Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm, the
Market Design literature has uncovered strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules for various single-
type matching problems such as school choice problems, on-campus housing assignments and
kidney exchange problems for patients (See section 5). However, as we have already seen, even if
we successfully design such a strategy-proof and Pareto eﬃcient rule for each single-type market,
the rules may collectively fail to be Pareto eﬃcient as an allocation procedure for a multiple-type
market. Theorem 1 guarantees that the practices of designing such a rule will lead to second-best
incentive compatibility - the impossibility of being Pareto-improved without sacrificing strategy-
proofness. Moreover, we have a rich class of second-best incentive compatible rules, since most
of prominent single-type rules, if not all, proposed in the literature are strategy-proof and non-
wasteful. The positive result and the richness of rules are in marked contrast to requiring the “first-
best incentive compatibility” (namely, the combination of strategy-proofness and Pareto eﬃciency)
which often results in an extremely unfair rule of serial dictatorship in our multiple-type setting.
That is, the eﬃciency loss in these rules is an inevitable cost of recovering the fairness and operating
markets independently as long as we preserve strategy-proofness.
In sum Theorem 1 provides us with a new perspective for Matching Market Design—the theo-
retical support for the independent operation and design of matching markets with a strategy-proof
and non-wasteful rule for each type.9 The support is even stronger if we note that a decentralized
trade from an arbitrary allocation would not work in a multiple-type market as the core may be
empty (Konishi, Quint, and Wako, 2001).10
9This is reminiscent of the first welfare theorem in the standard competitive equilibrium theory which guarantees
that if each independent individual “rationally” behaves in markets, the resulting allocation is eﬃcient. Likewise,
in our multiple-type market, if each independent designer uses strategy-proof and (at least) non-wasteful rule in
each market, the resulting rule is second-best eﬃcient for the whole market.
10We mean that a decentralized trade is one where mutually beneficial trades would be made until there are
no such trades. The core is defined to be an allocation from which there is no further mutually beneficial trade.
Note that in a single-type market the core is singleton and thus the procedure works well for reaching the unique
allocation in the core (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Roth and Postlewaite, 1977).
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1.1 Related literature
The most basic matching model is a house allocation problem (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Hylland
and Zeckhauser, 1979) where each agent demands one unit of an object. In addition to real-life
applications mentioned in the Introduction there are on-campus housing assignments for college
students (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999) and cadet-branch matching problem in the United
States Military Academy (So¨nmez and Switzer, 2013). See So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011) for their
comprehensive knowledge on Matching Market Design.
In contrast to the literature on the above basic problems, there are few papers on multiple-
type markets: Moulin (1995) introduces the model with an initial endowment, referred to as
multiple-type housing market, or generalized Shapley-Scarf housing market. Konishi, Quint, and
Wako (2001) show that the core might be empty in a multiple-type housing market. Moreover,
they show that no rule is strategy-proof, Pareto eﬃcient, and individually rational. Finally, Klaus
(2008) shows that the market-wise core mechanism satisfies the second-best incentive compatibility.
Similar to our paper, Monte and Tumennasan (2013) investigate a multiple-type markets without
endowments, and show that the combination of strategy-proofness, Pareto eﬃciency, and non-
bossiness implies the sequential dictatorship.
There is a similar but diﬀerent problem of multiple assignment where people demand multiple
units of objects though there is no type of objects. Thus the multiple assignment problem is
less restrictive than a multiple-type market because objects are exogenously divided into diﬀerent
groups in a multiple-type market. Pa´pai (2001) and Hatfield (2009) show that the combination
of strategy-proofness, Pareto eﬃciency, and non-bossiness results in a sequential dictatorship rule.
Klaus and Miyagawa (2001) also show a dictatorship result under solidarity and consistency when
the population can vary. Moreover, So¨nmez and U¨nver (2010); Budish and Cantillon (2012) ex-
amine course allocations at business schools.
The separability of preference is one of the key features in the theory where each agent consumes
multi unit of objects. The separability is assumed for the many-side agents in a many-to-one
two-sided matching market, agents in multiple-type markets, and those in multiple assignment
problems. Moreover, the studies of social choice functions on product spaces work on the separable
preference domain (e.g., Barbera`, Sonnenschein, and Zhou 1991; Le Breton and Sen 1999; Ju 2003;
Barbera`, Masso´, and Neme 2005). On the other hand, the study under interdependence or non-
separability of preferences has just started in matching models. In particular, Dur (2012) and
Dur and Wiseman (2015) consider a problem to allocate a number of school seats to the families
with siblings and neighbors. They consider a specific non-separable preference domain where each
family or neighbors prefer to receive the same school for their children. Thus, it is an important
issue to select a realistic interdependence of preferences corresponding to the multiple-type market
under consideration. Although we focus on separable preferences in this paper, we believe that
our results work as a benchmark and bring insights for non-separable preference domains.
With the separable preferences, an independent rule, which is our focus in our paper, is well-
defined where the entire rule consists independently of type-market rules. A few papers deal with
dependent rules. For example, in his introduced house allocation problem with the overlapping
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generations structure,11 Kurino (2014) considers a dependent rule under separable preferences
where in each period the previously assigned object becomes an endowment and thus aﬀects the
current rule through endowments. Kennes, Monte, and Tumennasan (2014) extend Kurino’s (2014)
model to a school choice problem under separable preferences, and focus on dependent rules where
in each period the previously assigned object aﬀects the current priority and thus type-rule.12
The taxation literature has the tradition to consider second-best eﬃcient allocations.13 As
is defined formally in Section 4, the second-best eﬃciency concept in this paper concerns about
the eﬃciency of an allocation rule under the constraint of strategy-proofness. To the best of our
knowledge, a variant of second-best incentive compatibility is first studied in Sasaki (2003) in the
context of divisible resource allocation problems with multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences.
The second-best incentive compatibility in the current paper is studied in Anno (2008); Anno and
Sasaki (2013) for the same model as Sasaki (2003). Moreover, Klaus (2008) investigates the concept
in a multiple-type housing market, while Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2009), Kesten and
Kurino (2013), Erdil (2014), and Fragiadakis and Troyan (2013) study it in single-type problems.
2 Model and Axioms
2.1 Multiple-type markets
We introduce a general model of multiple-type markets where an agent is interested in being
assigned multiple types of objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. A multiple-type
market is a list (N, T, (Ti)i∈N , (X t)t∈T , q, (Ri)i∈N): N := {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of agents with
|N | ≥ 2, while T is a finite set of types of objects (i.e., indivisible goods). We identify T with
{1, · · · , |T |}. If |T | = 1, we call a market single type. For each type t ∈ T , objects of type-t are
available. Let X t be a finite set of type-t objects with |X t| ≥ 2. For each type t ∈ T , q(xt) is the
quota of type-t object xt ∈ X t. That is, q is a function from ∪t∈TX t to Z++ and q(xt) indicates
the number of identical type-t object xt. Each agent i ∈ N is interested in at least one type of
objects, and consumes one object from each type in which she is interested. Let Ti ∈ 2T\{∅} be
the set of types in which agent i is interested (See Table 2). Moreover, for each type t ∈ T , let
N t := {i ∈ N |t ∈ Ti} be the set of agents who are interested in type-t objects. We assume that
for each t ∈ T , at least one agent is interested in the type-t, i.e., N t ￿= ∅. Throughout the paper
we maintain the following assumption.14
Assumption 1 (Existence of outside option). For each type t ∈ T , there is the type-t outside
option, denoted by ot, in X t which satisfies q(ot) ≥ |N t|.
In words, the assumption guarantees that every agent has the right to withdraw from the
market. The condition (q(ot) ≥ |N t|) means that the outside option ot is suﬃciently available
11In this interpretation, the set of types is viewed as the set of periods. Since we assume that the set of types is
finite, our model can accommodate a dynamic matching model with a finite horizon.
12Pereyra (2013) also extends Kurino’s (2014) to a school choice problem and then considers independent rules
under separable preferences.
13Hammond (2000) provides a good summary of the literature.
14The only exception is the paragraph right before Corollary 3. There we do not assume Assumption 1.
6
Table 2: An example of a multiple-type market
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Agent 1
√
T1 = {1}
Agent 2
√ √
T2 = {1, 2}
Agent 3
√ √
T3 = {2, 3}
N1 = {1, 2} N2 = {2, 3} N3 = {3}
Note: In this example, there are three agents and three types. The symbol
√
indicates which agent is interested in
what types of objects. For example, agent 2 is interested in both types 1 and 2.
so that it can be consumed by all agents interested in the type-t market at the same time. We
interpret it as the artificial object that represents the option to withdraw. We discuss in the
conclusion how this assumption aﬀects our main result.
Finally, we describe the preferences of agents. Since each agent i ∈ N consumes one object
from each type in Ti, her consumption space is Xi :=
￿
t∈Ti X
t. An element of Xi is called a
bundle, generically denoted by xi = (xti)t∈Ti ∈ Xi. For convenience and clarity, we introduce
some notations: For a finite set Y , let R(Y ) be the set of all complete and transitive binary
relations on Y , and P(Y ) the set of all complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relations
on Y .15 Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a preference relation Ri on Xi, i.e., Ri ∈ R(Xi). For
each Ri ∈ R(Xi), Pi and Ii denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of Ri. We denote R :=
(Ri)i∈N ∈
￿
i∈N R(Xi) and call it a profile. For each profile R = (R1, · · · , Rn) ∈
￿
i∈N R(Xi), and
each i ∈ N , the subprofile obtained by removing i’s preference is denoted by R−i; that is, R−i :=
(R1, · · · , Ri−1, Ri+1, · · · , Rn). It is convenient to write the profile (R1, · · · , Ri−1, R￿i, Ri+1, · · · , Rn)
as (R￿i;R−i).
Now, we introduce two classes of preferences. First, a preference Ri ∈ R(Xi) is separable
if for each t ∈ Ti there is a preference Rti ∈ P(X t) on type-t objects such that for each pair of
bundles {xi, x￿i} ⊆ Xi,
[ for each t ∈ Ti, xti Rti x￿ti ]⇒ xi Ri x￿i.
We denote by Rsep(Xi) the set of all separable preferences on Xi, and call Rti a type-t preference.
Let Psep(Xi) be the set of all separable strict preferences on Xi, i.e., Psep(Xi) = Rsep(Xi)∩P(Xi).
To introduce the second class of preferences, for each t ∈ T , let U t be the set of strict utility
functions on X t. That is, uti : X
t → R belongs to U t if uti is injective. A preference Ri ∈ R(Xi) is
additively separable if for each t ∈ Ti there is a utility function uti ∈ U t on type-t objects such
that for each pair of bundles {xi, x￿i} ⊆ Xi,
xi Ri x
￿
i ⇔
￿
t∈Ti
uti(x
t
i) ≥
￿
t∈Ti
uti(x
￿t
i ).
We denote by Radd(Xi) the set of all additively separable preferences on Xi, and by Padd(Xi) the
set of all additively separable strict preferences on Xi, i.e., Padd(Xi) = Radd(Xi) ∩ P(Xi). The
15A binary relation ≥ is complete if for each {y, y￿} ⊆ Y , y ≥ y￿ or y￿ ≥ y. A binary relation ≥ is transitive
if for each {y, y￿, y￿￿} ⊆ Y , y ≥ y￿ and y￿ ≥ y￿￿ imply y ≥ y￿￿. A binary relation ≥ is anti-symmetric if for each
{y, y￿} ⊆ Y , y ≥ y￿ and y￿ ≥ y imply y = y￿.
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next remark immediately follows from the definitions.
Remark 1. Let i ∈ N .
1. For each Ri ∈ Psep(Xi) ∪ Radd(Xi), the list of corresponding type-t preferences (Rti)t∈Ti is
unique.
2. We have the following relations among the classes of preferences.16
Padd(Xi) ￿ Psep(Xi)
￿ ￿
Radd(Xi) ￿ Rsep(Xi)
Let Di be the set of agent i’s admissible preferences. Let D :=
￿
i∈N Di be the set of admissible
profiles. In the rest of the paper we keep the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Admissible preferences). For each i ∈ N , Padd(Xi) ⊆ Di ⊆ Psep(Xi) ∪
Radd(Xi).
Our domain covers two types of wide ranges of domains: When one type consists of separable
strict preferences, it ranges from the additively separable domain to the universal one (See Item
2 in Remark 1, in particular Padd(Xi) ⊆ Psep(Xi)). The other type ranges from the strict domain
to the weak one when it consists of additively separable preferences (See Item 2 in Remark 1, in
particular Padd(Xi) ⊆ Radd(Xi)). As long as we keep a separability of preferences, ours is the most
natural and covers the widest range of domains in the literature.17 This completes the description
of a multiple-type market (N, T, (Ti)i∈N , (X t)t∈T , q, (Ri)i∈N). We assume throughout the paper
that N , T , (Ti)i∈N , (X t)t∈T , and q are fixed.
Let us emphasize that our model allows for agents’ partial participation on type markets (Ti ⊆
T ) and covers the full participation on all type markets (for each i ∈ N , Ti = T ) considered in the
literature.18
2.2 Type markets
Let a multiple-type market (N, T, (Ti)i∈N , (X t)t∈T , q, (Ri)i∈N) be given. Then, by Assumption 2
and Item 1 in Remark 1, for each i ∈ N and each Ri ∈ Di, each of the corresponding type-t
preference is unique and strict, and thus denoted by Rti. Thus, it makes sense to introduce the
type-t market induced from the multiple-type market. The induced type-t market is the single-
type market (N t, X t, q|Xt , (Rti)i∈Nt) where each agent i ∈ N t consumes one type-t object in X t;
q|Xt is the restriction of q to X t which indicates the quota q(xt) of each type-t object xt ∈ X t.
16Non-trivial statements are Padd(Xi) ￿= Psep(Xi), and Radd(Xi) ￿= Rsep(Xi). The proof of the latter can be
found on page 43 in Fishburn (1970). The former is proved in Appendix A.
17See Konishi, Quint, and Wako (2001); Klaus (2008); Monte and Tumennasan (2013) whose domain is the set
of separable strict preferences, Psep(Xi). An exception is Kurino (2014) who allows weak preferences, though his
dynamic model is slightly diﬀerent from the multiple-type goods model. Strictly speaking, Monte and Tumennasan’s
(2013) domain additionally assumes that the bundle consisting of outside options is worst.
18See Moulin (1995); Konishi, Quint, and Wako (2001); Klaus (2008); Monte and Tumennasan (2013).
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Finally, Rti is the type-t preference of agent i in P(X t). We denote Rt := (Rti)i∈Nt ∈ P(X t)Nt
and call it the type-t profile induced from (Ri)i∈N , or just the type profile induced from
(Ri)i∈N . 19 Similarly to the notations of profiles, we use Rt−i = (R
t
1, · · · , Rti−1, Rti+1, · · · , Rtn) and
(R￿ti ;R
t
−i) = (R
t
1, · · · , Rti−1, R￿ti , Rti+1, · · · , Rtn).
Note that our single-type market or type market, (N t, X t, q|Xt , (Rti)i∈Nt) , is the traditional
house allocation problem (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979), which can include the following real life
matching problems; House allocation with existing tenants, Kidney exchange, School choice. Sec-
tion 5 provides a description of these markets. See So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011) for a comprehensive
survey on the subject.
2.3 Rules
A type-t allocation is a function at from N t to X t such that each agent i ∈ N t is assigned type-t
object ati, and for each type-t object x
t ∈ X t the number of agents who are assigned xt does not
exceed the quota q(xt), i.e., |{i ∈ N t|ati = xt}| ≤ q(xt). Let At be the set of all type-t allocations.
An allocation, consisting of type allocations, is a := (a1, · · · , a|T |) ∈ ￿t∈T At where for each
t ∈ T , at is a type-t allocation. Let A := ￿t∈T At be the set of all allocations. Given a ∈ A, for
each i ∈ N , let ai be the agent i’s bundle at a, i.e., ai := (ati)t∈Ti .
We focus on deterministic rules in this paper. A rule selects an allocation for each profile in a
multiple-type market, i.e., it is a function ϕ : D → A. For each R ∈ D, ϕi(R) denotes the agent
i’s bundle at ϕ(R), and ϕt(R) denotes the type-t allocation at ϕ(R). On the other hand, a type-t
rule selects a type-t allocation for each type-t profile, i.e., it is a function Φt : P(X t)Nt → At.
For each Rt ∈ P(X t)Nt , Φti(Rt) denotes the agent i’s type-t object at Φt(Rt). Note that Φt(Rt)
depends only on the preferences of N t while ϕt(R) may depend on the preferences of N\N t. In
the conclusion we discuss how our main result can be aﬀected for a lottery rule.
Given a list of type rules, (Φt)t∈T , we can naturally define a rule for bundles due to separable
preferences:
Definition 1. A rule ϕ is independent if there exists a list of type rules (Φt)t∈T such that for
each R ∈ D and each t ∈ T , ϕt(R) = Φt(Rt). If such a (Φt)t∈T exists, it is unique. Thus, if a rule
ϕ is independent, we denote its corresponding type-t rule by Φt.
An independent rule, ϕ, treats each type market independently and separately in that a type-t
allocation under ϕ depends only on type-t preference profiles. Note also that an independent rule
is less informationally demanding than a dependent one, because the former only requires type
preferences and the latter requires preferences on bundles that contain type preferences.
Finally, we introduce the dominations of rules: An allocation a ∈ A (Pareto) dominates an
allocation b ∈ A at R ∈ D, written as a dom(R) b, if for each i ∈ N , ai Ri bi, and for some
i ∈ N , ai Pi bi. Similarly, a type-t allocation at ∈ At dominates a type-t allocation bt ∈ At
at Rt ∈ P(X t)Nt , written as at dom(Rt) bt, if for each i ∈ N t, ati Rti bti, and for some i ∈ N t,
19In the list (N t, Xt, q|Xt , (Rti)i∈Nt), for simplicity we omit the type set and the structure of interested types.
Note that in the type-t market, the type set is {t} and every agent i ∈ N t is interested in type-t.
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i. Now we can define the domination of rules: A rule ϕ dominates another rule ζ, written
as ϕ dom ζ if for each R ∈ D and each i ∈ N , ϕi(R) Ri ζi(R), and for some R ∈ D, ϕ(R)
dominates ζ(R) at R.
2.4 Axioms
We introduce axioms for both rules and type rules.
The first is an incentive compatibility axiom that says no agent can benefit from misreporting
her preference. A rule ϕ is strategy-proof if for each R ∈ D, each i ∈ N and each R￿i ∈ Di,
ϕi(R) Ri ϕi(R￿i;R−i). Similarly, a type-t rule Φ
t is strategy-proof if for each Rt ∈ P(X t)Nt ,
each i ∈ N t and each R￿ti ∈ P(X t), Φti(Rt) Rti Φti(R￿ti ;Rt−i).
The second is an eﬃciency axiom that says, for each profile, the selected allocation should not
be dominated by any other allocation at the profile. A rule ϕ is Pareto eﬃcient if for each
profile R ∈ D, there is no allocation a ∈ A such that a dominates ϕ(R) at R. Similarly, a type-t
rule Φt is Pareto eﬃcient if for each type-t profile Rt ∈ P(X t)Nt , there is no type-t allocation
at ∈ At such that at dominates Φt(Rt) at Rt.
The third is a weak eﬃciency axiom defined only for a type rule. A type-t rule Φt is non-
wasteful (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999) if for each Rt ∈ P(X t)Nt , each i ∈ N t and each xt ∈ X t,
xt P ti Φ
t
i(R
t) implies |{j ∈ N t|Φtj(Rt) = xt}| = q(xt).
The last one is a very weak form of a voluntary participation axiom that says for each profile
no agent can be worse oﬀ than nothing. A rule ϕ is individually rational if for each R ∈ D and
each i ∈ N , ϕi(R) Ri (ot)t∈Ti . Moreover, a type-t rule Φt is individually rational if for each
Rt ∈ P(X t)Nt and each i ∈ N t, Φti(Rt) Rti ot.
The following results are straightforward from definitions.
Remark 2. Let Φt be a type-t rule.
1. If Φt is Pareto eﬃcient, then Φt is non-wasteful. The converse is not always true.
2. If Φt is non-wasteful, then Φt is individually rational. The converse is not always true.
Remark 3. Suppose that a rule ϕ is independent.
1. For each t ∈ T , Φt is strategy-proof if and only if ϕ is strategy-proof.
2. If for each t ∈ T , Φt is individually rational, then ϕ is individually rational. The converse is
not always true.
3. If ϕ is Pareto eﬃcient, then for each t ∈ T , Φt is Pareto eﬃcient. The convese is not always
true.
Note that the example in Introduction is a proof of the latter statement in Item 3 — an
independent rule consisting of Pareto eﬃcient type-rules is not Pareto eﬃcient in a multiple-type
market.
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3 Three Classes of Priority-based Rules
We first introduce a priority profile, and then the three priority-based rules that have played central
roles in the literature. The single-type market with priority profiles is called a school choice problem
or a priority-based indivisible goods resource allocation problem in the literature.
A priority is defined for each type-t object that orders all agents who are interested in the type-t
market and expresses how each agent is treated for the object. Formally, a priority of type-t object
xt ∈ X t is a linear order in P(N t), denoted by ￿txt . We denote ￿t:= (￿txt)xt∈Xt ∈ P(N t)Xt and
call it a type-t priority profile. Moreover, we denote ￿:= (￿t)t∈T ∈
￿
t∈T P(N t)Xt a priority
profile.
3.1 Market-wise top trading cycles (TTC) rule
The top trading cycles (TTC) rule for a single-type market is introduced by Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (2003) who modify Gale’s top trading cycles described in Shapley and Scarf (1974). Given
a type-t profile Rt ∈ P(X t)Nt , the top trading cycles (TTC) type-rule induced by a type-t
priority profile ￿t, denoted by TTC￿t , selects a type-t allocation as follows:
Step 1: Each agent points to the most favorite object according to her preference and each object
points to the agent who has the highest priority for that object. Note that there is at least one
cycle. 20 Each agent in a cycle receives the object she points to and is removed from the market.
Each object in a cycle whose quota is one is also removed.
Step k(≥ 2): Each agent who has not been removed in previous steps points to the most favorite
object among the remaining objects according to her preference and each remaining object points
to the agent who has the highest priority among the remaining agents for that object. Note that
there is at least one cycle. Each agent in a cycle receives the object she points to and is removed
from the market. Each object in a cycle is also removed if the number of cycles containing the
object formed through k steps is equal to the quota of the object.
The algorithm terminates when no agent remains in the market.
Remark 4. For each type t ∈ T and each priority profile ￿t∈ P(N t)Xt , the TTC type-rule induced
by ￿t is strategy-proof and Pareto eﬃcient (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003), and thus is non-
wasteful and individually rational by Remark 2.
Definition 2. The market-wise top trading cycles (TTC) rule induced by a priority
profile ￿= (￿t), denoted by TTC￿, selects its type-t allocation as TTC￿t(Rt) that is chosen by
the TTC type rule induced by type-t priority profile ￿t.
Remark 5. Note that by Remarks 3 and 4, a market-wise TTC rule is strategy-proof and individually
rational. However, the example in Introduction can be used to show that it is not Pareto eﬃcient
for the priority profile in Table 3.
20A cycle is an ordered list of agents and objects (i1, x1, i2, x2, . . . , im, xm) such that i1 points to x1, x1 points to
i2, i2 points to x2, ..., im points to xm, and xm points to i1.
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Table 3: Priority profile
￿1a=￿1b ￿2c=￿2d
1 2
2 1
3.2 Market-wise deferred acceptance (DA) rule
The deferred acceptance (DA) rule for a single-type market is introduced by Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (2003) who apply Gale and Shapley’s (1962) agent-proposing deferred acceptance algo-
rithm in a college admissions problem to an indivisible goods resource allocation problem. Given a
type-t profile Rt ∈ P(X t)Nt , the deferred acceptance (DA) type-rule induced by a priority
profile ￿t, denoted by DA￿t , selects a type-t allocation as follows.
Step 1: Each agent applies to the most favorite object according to her preference. Each object
selects agents from its applicants up to its quota according to its priority and tentatively keeps
them. Any remaining agents are rejected.
Step k(≥ 2): Each agent who was rejected in the previous step applies to her next favorite object
according to her preference. Each object selects agents from its new applicants and the tentatively
kept agents up to its quota according to its priority and tentatively keeps them. Any remaining
agents are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no agent is rejected.
Remark 6. For each type t ∈ T and each type-priority profile ￿t∈ P(N t)Xt , the DA type-rule
induced by ￿t is strategy-proof and non-wasteful (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999), and thus is indi-
vidually rational by Remark 2.21
Definition 3. The market-wise deferred acceptance (DA) rule induced by a priority
profile ￿= (￿t)t∈T , denoted by DA￿, selects its type-t allocation as DA￿t(Rt) that is chosen
by the DA type-rule induced by type-t priority profile ￿t.
Remark 7. By Remarks 3 and 6, a market-wise DA rule is strategy-proof and individually rational.
However, the example in Introduction can be used to show that for some priority profile such as
in Table 3, each DA type-rule is Pareto eﬃcient but its market-wise DA is not Pareto eﬃcient.
3.3 Market-wise serial dictatorship (SD) rule
The serial dictatorship (SD) rule for a type-t market with respect to a priority order ≥t∈ P(N t),
written as SD≥t , is described as follows: for each type-t preference profile, letting the highest-
priority agent with respect to ≥t have her best object, the second-highest-priority agent with
respect to ≥t have her best among those remaining, and so on.
21Ergin (2002) characterizes the priority profiles under which the type-t DA rule is Pareto eﬃcient. Kesten (2006)
characterizes the priority profiles under which the type-t TTC rule is fair in terms of envies at the selected type-t
allocation.
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Note that given a priority order ≥t∈ P(N t), the serial dictatorship rule for a type-t market
with respect to ≥t is strategy-proof and Pareto eﬃcient, and moreover coincides with the TTC
and DA rules for a type-t market with the priority profile ￿t∈ P(N t)Xt in which for each object
xt ∈ X t, ￿txt=≥t.
Definition 4. The market-wise serial dictatorship (SD) rule induced by a list of priority
orders ≥= (≥t)t∈T ∈ ￿t∈T P(N t), denoted by SD≥, selects its type-t allocation as SD≥t(Rt)
that is chosen by the SD type-rule induced by type-t priority order ≥t.
Remark 8. Note that by Remarks 2 and 3, a market-wise SD rule is strategy-proof and individually
rational. However, the example in Introduction can be used to show that it is not Pareto eﬃcient
for the priority profile in Table 3.
Remark 9. The serial dictatorship (SD) rule induced by a priority ≥∗∈ P(N) selects an allocation
for each profile R ∈ D as follows: The highest-priority agent under ≥∗ receives her best bundle,
the second-highest-priority agent under ≥∗ receives her best bundle among remaining objects, and
so on.
Note that the SD rule induced by ≥∗ coincides with the market-wise SD rule induced by (≥t)t∈T
when the type-t priority ≥t is the same as in ≥∗ |Nt . In this sense the SD rule is a special case of
the market-wise SD rule.
4 Main Results
It is known that strategy-proofness and Pareto eﬃciency are compatible in our setting (Monte and
Tumennasan, 2013). The leading example is a serial dictatorship rule in which agents choose their
favorite bundle one by one according to a fixed priority order (Remark 9). However, the rule is
extremely unfair. For example, when agents have homogeneous preferences and each type object
is of unit quotas, the highest priority agent receives her best object for all types which are envied
by all of the other agents. A natural way to mitigate this extreme unfairnass is to alternate the
dictator across types. As we saw in the previous section, we have a rich class of strategy-proof rules
each of whose type rules satisfy a weaker eﬃciency notion of non-wastefulness. Because these might
not be Pareto eﬃcient in general, we turn to a weaker notion of eﬃciency - second-best eﬃciency
- rather than Pareto eﬃciency, while focusing on strategy-proof rules: a rule ϕ is second-best
incentive compatible if ϕ is strategy-proof and no strategy-proof rule dominates ϕ. In other
words, a second-best incentive compatible rule is in the Pareto frontier of the set of strategy-proof
rules.22
We now state the main result of this paper. The proof is in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. Suppose that a rule ϕ is independent and for each t ∈ T , its type rule Φt : P(X t)Nt →
At is strategy-proof and non-wasteful. Then, ϕ is second-best incentive compatible.
22Our research direction here can be summarized as follows: Find the best (the most eﬃcient) strategy-proof
rules. Another natural direction is : Find the best (the most invulnerable to the strategic behaviors) eﬃcient rules.
Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) and Chen, Egesdal, Pycia, and Yenmez (2014) study how to make a ranking of rules by
manipulability among stable rules in a single-type market.
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In other words, if we adopt a strategy-proof and non-wasteful rule for each type market, the
overall rule is second-best incentive compatible. In this sense, Theorem 1 supports both the in-
dependent operation of type markets currently done in most real-life markets, and our current
practices in Market Design - independent consideration of the design of each type market.
Since TTC type-rules and DA type-rules are strategy-proof and non-wasteful (Remarks 4 and
6), we have the following immediate corollaries.
Corollary 1. For each priority profile ￿∈￿t∈T P(N t)Xt, the market-wise top trading cycles rule
TTC￿ is second-best incentive compatible.23
Corollary 2. For each priority profile ￿∈ ￿t∈T P(N t)Xt, the market-wise deferred acceptance
rule DA￿ is second-best incentive compatible.
To state our next corollary, we introduce a multiple-type housing market which is a
variant of multiple-type markets.24 A multiple-type housing market is a multiple-type market
(N, T, (Ti)i∈N , (X t)t∈T , q,ω) in which the outside options do not necessarily exist. In this para-
graph only, we do not assume Assumption 1. Instead we only assume that for each t ∈ T ,￿
xt∈Xt q(x
t) ≥ |N t|, i.e., there are enough objects for each agent to receive an object in each
market in which she is interested. The allocation ω ∈ A describes the system of property rights
in the economy. We interpret that agent i has the property right for the object wti . Note that the
pure distributional case, i.e., no agent has the property right in each market, is a special case of
our model. In this case, for each t ∈ T and each i ∈ N t, ωti = ot. Our model is a generalization of
the model in Konishi, Quint, and Wako (2001) and Klaus (2008) in the following four points. (i)
Some agents may be interested only in a fraction of T . (ii) For each t ∈ T , |X t| may not be equal
to |N t|. (iii) We do not exclude multiple quota. (iv) We do not exclude indiﬀerence in preferences.
A market-wise top trading cycles rule for a multiple-type housing market is the one
induced by a priority profile ￿= (￿t)t∈T ∈
￿
t∈T P(N t)Xt such that for each type t ∈ T and each
type-t object xt, if an agent i ∈ N t is an owner of xt, namely xt = ωti , then for each j ∈ N t with
j ￿txt i, j is also an owner of xt. In this setup, we have the following result.
Corollary 3. (Klaus, 2008) Every market-wise top trading cycles rule for a multiple-type housing
market is second-best incentive compatible.25
Our Corollary 3 is more general than Klaus’s (2008) original result due to the above four
diﬀerences in the setup. Furthermore, Theorem 1 is a substantial extension of Klaus’s result, as we
use non-wastefulness for type rules instead of Pareto eﬃciency implied by the TTC type-rule.26
If we turn to single-type markets, we have the following corollaries:
23In a single-type market, a TTC rule is in a subclass of Pa´pai’s (2000) hierarchical exchange rules or Pycia and
U¨nver’s (2009) trading cycles rules that are group strategy-proof and Pareto eﬃcient. Thus, by Theorem 1, if we
adopt theirs as type rules, the resulting rule is second-best incentive compatible.
24This model is sometimes referred to as the generalized Shapley-Scarf housing market. Here, we present a further
generalized version of the model in which multiple quotas are allowed.
25Rigorously speaking, Corollary 3 is not a direct consequence of Theorem 1 due to Assumption 1. However, our
proof immediately implies Corollary 3, which is given in the Appendix.
26To employ non-wastefulness for type rules instead of Pareto eﬃciency causes a technical diﬃculty. A discussion
on this point can be found in the Appendix.
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Corollary 4. (Kesten, 2010) In a single-type market, there is no strategy-proof and Pareto
eﬃcient rule that dominates the deferred acceptance rule. 27
Corollary 5. (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth, 2009; Kesten and Kurino, 2013;
Erdil, 2014). In a single-type market, the deferred acceptance rule is second-best incentive com-
patible.
Corollary 6. (Erdil, 2014) In a single-type market, a strategy-proof and non-wasteful rule is
second-best incentive compatible.
Corollaries 5 and 6 are respectively counterparts of Corollary 2 and Theorem 1 for a single-
type market. However, note that we cannot show Corollary 2 (Theorem 1) by applying Corollary 5
(Corollary 6) to each type market. To see this, let us recall the proof technique in Abdulkadirog˘lu,
Pathak, and Roth (2009) and Erdil (2014): Like we do, they suppose for a contradiction that a
strategy-proof rule, ζ, dominates a strategy-proof and non-wasteful rule, ϕ. Then they find some
agent i and some profile R with ζi(R) Pi ϕi(R) Pi o, and then use a special kind of manipulation
to upgrade the outside option between ζi(R) and ϕi(R) in i’s preference, which eventually leads to
a contradiction. However, this technique does not work in a multiple-type market as the situation
is drastically changed in the following sense: A dominating strategy-proof rule ζ may assign an
object which is worse than the outside option in some type markets, because the domination only
requires that the bundle assigned by ζ is at least as good as the bundle assigned by ϕ. That
is, it is possible that ϕti(R) P
t
i o
t P ti ζ
t
i (R) for some type-t.
28 Note that this situation does not
violate ζi(R) Ri ϕi(R) in a multiple-type market. Hence each type-rule in a multiple-type market
behaves very diﬀerently from a rule in a single-type market.
Before we close this section, let us emphasize the technical advantages of our result. Note
that our result is valid in various preference domains including the additively separable weak
preference domain. It is known that several technical diﬃculties arise from the indiﬀerence in
single-type markets (Erdil and Ergin, 2007). Although type preferences are assumed to be strict,
Theorem 1 indicates that the second-best incentive compatibility is robust for the indiﬀerence with
respect to bundles. Furthermore, as pointed out in Kesten and Kurino (2013), the second-best
incentive compatibility is sensitive to domain restriction. Since the set of additively separable strict
preferences is smaller than the set of all separable strict preferences (See Remark 1), Theorem 1
− more precisely, the preference construction given in Lemma 1 in the Appendix − clarifies a
technical limitation of domain restriction for the second-best incentive compatibility result.
5 Market Design Applications
We briefly describes the representative type-markets and those propsed type-rules discussed in the
literature. The type-rules taken up in each subsection are strategy-proof and at least non-wasteful.
27We note however that Kesten’s (2010) original theorem is also valid when the outside option does not exist.
28Remember that we assume that ϕ is independent and each type-rule Φt is strategy-proof and non-wasteful in
Theorem 1. Thus, for each t ∈ T , ϕti(R) Ri ot.
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Theorem 1 implies that an independent rule of using those type-rules in these type markets is
second-best incentive compatible.
5.1 House allocation with existing tenants
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) introduce the problem that deals with the on-campus housing
assignments for U.S. college students. The problem can be applied not only to the on-campus
housing assignment but also the public housing assignment. In this setting, the set N t of agents
is divided into the set N tN of newcomers and the set N
t
E of existing tenants, while objects refer to
houses. Corresponding to each existing tenant i ∈ N tE is a unique occupied house ωti ∈ X t \ {ot}
which is interpreted as the house that agent i currently lives in. Each newcomer is assumed to
occupy the outside option ot.
To remedy the welfare losses observed in practice, inspired by Gale’s celebrated assignment
method, Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) propose the top trading cycles (AS-TTC) type-
rule induced by a priority ordering ≥t∈ P(N t). The type-rule is the TTC-type rule induced by
the following type-t priority profile ￿t that is introduced in Section 3.1: 29 For each xt ∈ X t, let
N t(xt) := {i ∈ N t|ωti = xt} be the set of agents who occupy xt. Note that N t(xt) can be empty.
Then, for each xt ∈ X t, ￿txt satisfies: (i) ￿txt |Nt\Nt(xt) =≥t |Nt\Nt(xt), and (ii) for each {i, j} ⊆ N t,
if i ∈ N t(xt) and j ￿txt i , then j ∈ N t(xt).
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) show that the AS-TTC type-rule is strategy-proof and
Pareto eﬃcient, which also follows from Remark 4.
5.2 Kidney exchange
Transplantation is the preferred treatment for patients diagnosed with end-stage kidney disease.
Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver (2004) introduce the problem that aims to eﬃciently organize direct
exchanges among medically incompatible donor-patient pairs as well as indirect exchanges that
involve one incompatible donor-patient and deceased donors. In the setting, agents refer to patients
and objects refer to kidneys. Each patient i ∈ N t is paired with a kidney ki ∈ X t \ {ot} with
q(ki) = 1 supplied by her intended donor. Thus |N t| = |X t \ {ot}|. Every patient also has the
option to enter the waiting list for cadaveric kidneys with priority. Let w be the outside option of
waiting lists. 30
Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver (2004) propose an inventory of top trading cycles and chains
(TTCC) type-rules as a plausible generalization of the top trading cycles method to this setting.
31 A cycle is an ordered list (k1, i1, k2, i2, . . . , km, im) such that kidney k1 points to patient i1,
patient i1 points to kidney k2, ..., kidney km points to patient im, and patient im points to kidney
29We modify the original description of AS-TTC type rule to use our description of the TTC type-rule in Section
3.1.
30Unlike the original framework of Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver (2004) that allows for strict preferences, later models
of the kidney exchange deal with dichotomous preferences (e.g., Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver, 2005; Yilmaz, 2011).
31In what follows, for breavity we do not provide a self-contained and thorough description of TTCC type-rules.
We refer the reader to Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver (2004) for a comprehensive account of the rule. See also So¨nmez
and U¨nver (2013).
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k1. A w-chain is an ordered list (k1, i1, k2, i2, . . . , km, im) such that kidney k1 points to patient i1,
patient i1 points to kidney k2, ..., kidney km points to patient im, and patient im points to w.
The TTCC algorithm is based on iteratively identifying cycles and w-chains in a directed graph
and carrying out the induced trades. 32 The way w-chains are handled in the algorithm depends on
the so-called chain selection rule. Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver (2004) discuss various chain selection
rules and investigate their implications for welfare and incentives. Of particular interest to us
among these are those rules that induce strategy-proofness and Pareto eﬃciency of TTCC.
5.3 School choice
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) introduce the problem that concerns student assignment to
public schools. In this context agents refer to the students, objects refer to the schools, and the
outside option represents other education options such as private schools. Additionally, each school
xt ∈ X t has a priority ￿txt over students which is a linear order in P(N t).
A school choice problem (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003) is a type market with a type-
priority profile. Thus our descriptions of the TTC type-rule and the DA type-rule in Section 3
are for a school choice problem. Thus the TTC type-rule is strategy-proof and Pareto eﬃcient
(Remark 4) and the DA type-rule is strategy-proof and non-wasteful (Remark 6).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider eﬃciency for strategy-proof rules in a multiple-type market. The full
eﬃciency is strong enough that we end up with an extremely unfair rule such as the serial dicta-
torship (Monte and Tumennasan, 2013). We turn to a weaker eﬃciency notion of the second-best
incentive compatibility that requires a rule to be strategy-proof and not be dominated by any other
strategy-proof rules. Our main result is the second-best incentive compatibility of a market-wise
application of non-wasteful and strategy-proof type rules that include the two well-known priority-
based rules of top trading cycles (TTC) and deferred acceptance (DA). This result shows a rich
class of simple and reasonable strategy-proof rules are included in the Pareto frontier of strategy-
proof rules, and moreover supports our practices of designing a type rule to be strategy-proof and
at least non-wasteful in Matching Market Design.
We now discuss the existence of the outside options in Assumption 1. As Kesten and Kurino
(2013) point out, Corollary 6 does not hold when there is no outside option: For example, consider
a single-type market with n agents and n objects with unit quotas. Then, a constant allocation
rule is strategy-proof and non-wasteful. However, the rule is dominated by the corresponding core
rule which is also strategy-proof. With the same logic, our main result of Theorem 1 no longer holds
32Although there are clear similarities between the AS-TTC type-rule in a house allocation problem with existing
tenants and the TTCC type-rule in the kidney exchange problem, the adaptations of the top trading cycles method
diﬀer in terms of the role the outside option plays. In the former context the outside option always points to the
highest priority agent, whereas in the latter context, the w-option never points to any agent. This subtle nuance is
one main source of the diﬀerence between the two rules, and the reason why TTCC type-rules are not described as
a special case of the TTC type-rules introduced in Section 3.1.
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without Assumption 1. As Kesten and Kurino (2013) show, for a single-type market without the
outside option, the DA rule is second-best incentive compatible. It is an interesting open question
to prove that for a multiple-type market without outside options, the market-wise DA rule is
second-best incentive compatible.
In this paper we have focused on deterministic rules. There is a growing literature on lottery
rules in matching problems (e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998; Bogomolnaia and Moulin,
2001; Che and Kojima, 2010). Although the counterpart of Theorem 1 for lottery rules for a
single-type market are still true, Erdil (2014) show that the counterpart cannot be applied to an
interesting class of lottery rules such as the random serial dictatorship (RSD) which randomly
selects a priority and implements the serial dictatorship for the realized priority because RSD is
wasteful. Moreover, we have not yet known any strategy-proof and non-wasteful lottery rule even
in a single-type market. Hence we doubt the usefulness of the extension of our Theorem 1 to lottery
rules in a multiple-type market. Therefore the future direction that we could take in the same
spirit of our paper is to find a general strategy-proof rule dominating a practical strategy-proof
rule. For a single-type market, Erdil constructed an artificial lottery rule that is strategy-proof and
dominates RSD. However, his rule is quite limited to a small economy and a general dominating
rule against stochastic DA or TTC is not known yet. Thus it is an interesting open question as
to how much room we can have against those interesting lottery rules for eﬃciency while keeping
strategy-proofness. We believe that this paper could be a benchmark in this direction, and could
clarify technical limitations and provide technical tools for the question.
A Appendix: Proof of Remark 1
Claim 1. Padd(Xi) ￿= Psep(Xi).
Proof. The proof idea is similar to the one in page 43 in Fishburn (1970) that shows Radd(Xi) ￿
Rsep(Xi). Suppose that X1 = X2 = {x, y, z} and Xi = X1 × X2. Let Ri be the preference such
that
(x, x) Pi (x, y) Pi (y, x) Pi (z, x) Pi (y, y) Pi (x, z) Pi (y, z) Pi (z, y) Pi (z, z).
Obviously Ri ∈ Psep(Xi). We show Ri ￿∈ Padd(Xi). Suppose to the contrary that (u1, u2) ∈ U1×U2
represents Ri. Since (z, x) Pi (x, z) and (y, z) Pi (z, y), u1(z) + u2(x) > u1(x) + u2(z) and
u1(y) + u2(z) > u1(z) + u2(y). Thus u1(z) + u2(x) + u1(y) + u2(z) > u1(x) + u2(z) + u1(z) + u2(y).
Cancelling out u1(z) and u2(z), we obtain u1(y) + u2(x) > u1(x) + u2(y). This violates that
(x, y) Pi (y, x).
B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
We first introduce some notations: For each ￿∈ R(Y ) and each y ∈ Y , let UC(￿, y), SUC(￿, y),
LC(￿, y) and SLC(￿, y) be the upper, strict upper, lower, and strict lower contour set of ￿ at y,
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respectively. That is, UC(￿, y) := {z ∈ Y |z ￿ y}, SUC(￿, y) := {z ∈ Y |z ￿ y and not y ￿ z},
LC(￿, y) := {z ∈ Y |y ￿ z} and SLC(￿, y) := {z ∈ Y |y ￿ z and not z ￿ y}.
Before we prove Theorem 1, we provide four lemmas. Lemma 1 states that the domain D is
rich enough to choose the preferences we need in the proofs of subsequent lemmas and theorem.
Lemma 1. Let i ∈ N . Let (R˜ti) ∈
￿
t∈Ti P(X t) and x˜i ∈ Xi. There exists Ri ∈ Padd(Xi) such that
(i) ∀t ∈ Ti, Rti = R˜ti and
(ii) ∀xi ∈ Xi, [{∃t ∈ Ti s.t. xti ∈ SLC(R˜ti, x˜ti)}⇒ x˜i Pi xi].
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that Ti = T . For each t ∈ T , let X t = {xt1, · · · , xt|Xt|},
and assume, without loss of generality, that xt1 R˜ti x
t2 R˜ti · · · R˜ti xt|Xt|. For each t ∈ T , let
kt ∈ Z++ be the cardinality of UC(R˜ti, x˜ti) where xtkt = x˜ti. Let k￿t := |X t|− kt, K :=
￿
t∈T kt and
K ￿ :=
￿
t∈T k
￿
t. Define (u
t
i) ∈
￿
t∈T U t as follows:
u1i (x
11) = 10K−1, u1i (x12) = 10K−2, · · · u1i (x1k1) = 10K−k1 ,
u2i (x
21) = 10K−(k1+1), u2i (x22) = 10K−(k1+2), · · · u2i (x2k2) = 10K−(k1+k2),
...
...
...
u|T |i (x
|T |1) = 10K−(
￿|T |−1
t=1 kt+1), u|T |i (x
|T |2) = 10K−(
￿|T |−1
t=1 kt+2), · · · u|T |i (x|T |k|T |) = 10K−(
￿
t∈T kt)(= 100).
Let C ￿ := 2
￿
t∈T u
t
i(x
t1) and C := C ￿ + 1. 33 In the following, for each t ∈ T , if k￿t = 0, then
the corresponding row should be skipped.
u1i (x
1(k1+1)) = 110 − C, u1i (x1(k1+2)) = 1102 − C, · · · u1i (x1|X
1|) = 1
10k
￿
1
− C,
u2i (x
2(k2+1)) = 1
10k
￿
1+1
− C, u2i (x2(k2+2)) = 110k￿1+2 − C, · · · u
2
i (x
2|X2|) = 1
10k
￿
1+k
￿
2
− C,
...
...
...
u|T |i (x
|T |(k|T |+1)) = 1
10
￿|T |−1
t=1 k
￿
t+1
− C, u|T |i (x|T |(k
￿
|T |+1)) = 1
10
￿|T |−1
t=1 k
￿
t+2
− C, · · · u|T |i (x|T ||X
|T ||) = 1
10
￿|T |
t=1 k
￿
t
− C.
Now, we define Ri ∈ R(Xi) as follows: for each {yi, zi} ⊆ Xi,
yi Ri zi ⇔
￿
t∈T
uti(y
t
i) ≥
￿
t∈T
uti(z
t
i).
Obviously, Ri ∈ Radd(Xi) ⊆ Rsep(Xi). It is also obvious that (Rti)t∈T = (R˜ti)t∈T , i.e., Item (i) is
satisfied.
We show that Ri satisfies Item (ii). Let yi ∈ Xi be such that for some t ∈ T , yti ∈ SLC(Rti, x˜ti).
Note that yi has at least one coordinate whose utility contains the −C term while x˜i does not.
Therefore,
￿
t∈T u
t
i(x˜
t
i) > 0 >
￿
t∈T u
t
i(y
t
i). Thus, x˜i Pi yi. Thus, Item (ii) is satisfied.
Finally, we prove that Ri ∈ Padd(Xi). By construction, Ri ∈ Radd(Xi). Since Padd(Xi) =
Radd(Xi)∩P(Xi), we need to show Ri ∈ P(Xi). Let yi, zi be such that
￿
t∈T u
t
i(y
t
i) =
￿
t∈T u
t
i(z
t
i).
33Note that C ￿ is greater than the utility obtained by the bundle (x11, · · · , x|T |1) which is the best bundle according
to the resulting preference Ri.
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First, we claim that the number of types in which the type object is worse than x˜ti is the same
between yi and zi.
Claim 2. |{t ∈ T |x˜ti P ti yti}| = |{t ∈ T |x˜ti P ti zti}|.
Let α := |{t ∈ T |x˜ti P ti yti}| and β := |{t ∈ T |x˜ti P ti zti}|. Suppose to the contrary that α ￿= β.
Assume, without loss of generality, that α < β. We can decompose the utility into three parts:￿
t∈T
uti(y
t
i) =
￿
t∈T
ytiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(y
t
i) + (
￿
t∈T
x˜tiP
t
i y
t
i
uti(y
t
i) + αC)− αC.
Since 0 ≤ (￿ t∈T
x˜tiP
t
i y
t
i
uti(y
t
i) + αC) < 1, we have
￿
t∈T
ytiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(y
t
i)− αC ≤
￿
t∈T
uti(y
t
i) ≤
￿
t∈T
ytiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(y
t
i) + 1− αC.
Similarly, we have ￿
t∈T
ztiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(z
t
i)− βC ≤
￿
t∈T
uti(z
t
i) ≤
￿
t∈T
ztiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(z
t
i) + 1− βC.
Thus, we have
(
￿
t∈T
ytiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(y
t
i)− αC)− (
￿
t∈T
ztiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(z
t
i) + 1− βC) = −1 + (
￿
t∈T
ytiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(y
t
i)−
￿
t∈T
ztiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(z
t
i)) + (β − α)C
≥ −1 + (−12C ￿) + (β − α)C
￿
∵
￿
t∈T
ytiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(y
t
i)−
￿
t∈T
ztiR
t
i x˜
t
i
uti(z
t
i) ≥ −
1
2
C ￿
￿
= −1 + (−12C ￿) + (β − α)C ￿ + (β − α) ≥ 12C ￿ > 0. (∵ α < β)
Thus,
￿
t∈T u
t
i(z
t
i) <
￿
t∈T u
t
i(y
t
i), a contradiction. Thus, α = β. The proof of the Claim is
completed.
Now we complete the proof of Ri ∈ P(Xi). Let us express Y :=
￿
t∈T u
t
i(y
t
i) + αC as a
(K +K ￿) digits rational number. That is, Y = Y1Y2 · · ·YK .YK+1YK+2 · · ·YK+K￿ . 34 Note that by
the construction, each digit is equal to 1 or 0. Note also that (Y1, · · · , Yk1 , YK+1, · · · , YK+k￿1) tells
us which type-1 object is assigned at yi since for each k ∈ {1, · · · k1, K + 1, · · · , K + k￿1}, Yk = 1 if
and only if
y1i =
x1k if 1 ≤ k ≤ k1x1(k−K+k1) otherwise
In general, for t ≥ 2, (Y￿
t￿<t kt￿+1, · · · , Y￿t￿≥t kt￿ , YK+￿t￿<t k￿t￿+1, · · · , YK+￿t￿≥t k￿t￿ ) tells us the type-
t object at yi. Therefore, we can identify the bundle yi with the value of Y . Similarly, let
34Note that Y1 denotes the 10K−1’s place of Y (which may be 0), Y2 denotes the 10K−2’s place of Y (which may
be 0) and so on. Similarly, YK+1 denotes the
1
10 ’s place of Y , YK+2 denotes the
1
102 ’s place of Y and so on.
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Z :=
￿
t∈T u
t
i(z
t
i) + βC and
Z = Z1Z2 · · ·ZK .ZK+1ZK+2 · · ·ZK+K￿ .
Since
￿
t∈T u
t
i(y
t
i) =
￿
t∈T u
t
i(z
t
i) and α = β (∵ Claim), we have Y =
￿
t∈T u
t
i(y
t
i) + αC =￿
t∈T u
t
i(z
t
i) + βC = Z. Thus, yi = zi.
We introduce notations: For each i ∈ N , each t ∈ Ti, each Rti ∈ P(X t), each Ri ∈ Di and each
R ∈ D, let
B(Rti) := |SUC(Rti, ot)|,
B(Ri) :=
￿
t∈Ti
B(Rti), and
B(R) :=
￿
i∈N
B(Ri).
Namely, B is the operator that assigns the number of object(s) which are preferred to the outside
option(s). For each R ∈ D, let I(R) be the number of agents whose preferences are not strict at
R, i.e.,
I(R) := |{i ∈ N |Ri ￿∈ P(Xi)}|.
The following two notions are the key to the proof of Theorem 1. Given R ∈ D, an allocation
a ∈ A coordinate-wise weakly dominates b ∈ A at R, written as a cw-dom(R) b, if
∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ Ti, ati Rti bti.
Given a pair of rules (ζ,ϕ), a profile R ∈ D satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)−reverse property if
∃i ∈ N s.t.
￿
ζi(R) Pi ϕi(R) and {∃t ∈ Ti s.t. ϕti(R) P ti ζti (R)}
￿
. 35
Let us sketch the proof of Theorem 1. 36 The proof shall be done by a contradiction. Therefore,
we assume that there exists a strategy-proof rule ζ which dominates ϕ. Let R(1) ∈ D be such that
ζ(R(1)) dominates ϕ(R(1)) at R(1). Starting from this, we inductively construct two sequences of
non-negative integers {N (k)}∞k=0 and {B(k)}∞k=1 satisfying Items (seq-i) and (seq-ii).
(seq-i) {N (k)}∞k=0 is weakly decreasing, i.e., N (0) ≥ N (1) ≥ N (2) ≥ · · · .
(seq-ii) If N (k−1) does not decrease (N (k−1) = N (k)), then the corresponding part of {B(k)}∞k=1
decreases, i.e., for each k ∈ N, if N (k−1) = N (k), then B(k) > B(k+1). 37
In each induction step of the proof, we shall choose an agent i(k) and her new preference R(k+1)
i(k)
,
and define N (k) := |N\{i(1), · · · , i(k)}| and B(k+1) := B(R(k+1)
i(k)
;R(k)−i(k)). It is a process of successive
35Note that if ζ dom ϕ and R ∈ D satisfies (ζ,ϕ)−reverse property, then ζ(R) dom(R) ϕ(R).
36Our proof is greatly inspired by the one in Klaus (2008).
37Note that these sequences cause a contradiction since sequences of non-negative integers cannot meet both
(seq-i) and (seq-ii).
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preference replacements to satisfy Item (seq-ii) as Item (i) is automatically satisfied by definition,
which is made possible by the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property at the profile under consideration. 38 The
simplest case is when every profile satisfies the reverse property. One such simple case is: each
type-rule Φt is Pareto eﬃcient and D =￿i∈N Psep(Xi). 39
However, the assumptions of Theorem 1 navigate away the above situation in two ways. First,
we only assume non-wastefulness for each type rule instead of Pareto eﬃciency. Second, the
preference domain contains weak preferences. Even under one of these weak assumptions, it is
easy to show that a given preference profile may not satisfy the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property. For
this reason, in addition to the process constructing {N (k)}∞k=0 and {B(k)}∞k=1 (let us call it the
constructing process), we need another process to transit from a profile without the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse
property toward a profile with the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property (let us call it the transition process).
Lemmas 2 to 4 show how we transit from one profile to another. Under a given profile without
the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, we use two types of transition according to whether the coordinate-
wise weak domination occurs in the profile or not. Lemma 2 describes the transition when the
domination occurs, while Lemma 3 describes when the domination does not. Lemma 4 guarantees
that repeating these transitions, we finally reach a profile with the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property. In
sum, the proof of Theorem 1 is the constructing process in which each step contains the transition
process. 40
Note that both the constructing process and the transition process contain preference replace-
ments of agents. When we prove that the resulting sequences satisfy (seq-ii), we need the following:
once an agent is involved in the preference replacement with respect to the constructing process,
she is never involved in the preference replacement with respect to the subsequent transition pro-
cess. In other words, we need to design the transition process so as not to disturb the constructing
process. This trick is realized by Items (lem2-1), (lem3-1) and Item (i) in Lemma 4.
Now, we present Lemma 2. It tells us how we transit from a profile if the coordinate-wise weak
domination occurs in the profile. Item (lem2-2) is needed to terminate the induction process in
Lemma 4 in a finite number of steps, and it is also needed to prove Item (ii) in Lemma 4, which is
also a trick to prove that two sequences in the proof of Theorem 1 satisfies (seq-ii). Item (lem2-3)
guarantees that the induction argument in Lemma 4 bites.
Lemma 2. Suppose that a rule ϕ is independent and for each t ∈ T , Φt : P(X t)Nt → At is
strategy-proof and non-wasteful. Suppose also that a strategy-proof rule ζ dominates ϕ. Let R ∈ D
be such that ζ(R) dom(R) ϕ(R). If ζ(R) cw-dom(R) ϕ(R), then there exist i ∈ N and R￿i ∈ Di
such that
(lem2-1) ∃ t ∈ Ti s.t. ζti (R) P ti ϕti(R) P ti ot,
(lem2-2) B(R￿i;R−i) < B(R) and I(R
￿
i;R−i) ≤ I(R), and
38The detailed construction of a new preference is indicated by conditions (1∗− i), (1∗− ii), (k∗− i) and (k∗− ii)
in the proof of Theorem 1.
39See Lemma 1 in Klaus (2008).
40Therefore, the profiles in the proof of Theorem 1 are doubly indexed. The first index indicates the steps of the
constructing process, and the second index indicates the steps of the transition process.
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(lem2-3) ζ(R￿i;R−i) dom(R
￿
i;R−i) ϕ(R
￿
i;R−i).
Proof. First, we show that there exists i ∈ N satisfying (lem2-1). Suppose to the contrary that
for each i ∈ N and each t ∈ Ti, [ϕti(R) P ti ot ⇒ ϕti(R) Rti ζti (R)]. Since ζ(R) cw-dom(R) ϕ(R), the
hypothesis is equivalent to
∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ Ti, [ϕti(R) P ti ot ⇒ ϕti(R) = ζti (R)]. (1)
Claim 3. ∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ Ti, [ϕti(R) = ot ⇒ ζti (R) = ot].
Suppose not. Let i ∈ N and t ∈ Ti be such that ϕti(R) = ot and ζti (R) ￿= ot. Let xt := ζti (R) and
at := (ϕti(R))i∈Nt . We show that at least one unit of the object x
t is not assigned to any agent
at the type-t allocation at. By (1), for each j ∈ N t, [atj = xt ⇒ ζtj(R) = xt]. Thus, since ati = ot
and ζti (R) = x
t, we have |{j ∈ N t|atj = xt}| < |{j ∈ N t|ζtj(R) = xt}| ≤ q(xt). However, since
ζ(R) cw-dom(R) ϕ(R) and type preferences are strict, xt = ζti (R) P
t
i ϕ
t
i(R) = Φ
t
i(R
t), a violation
of non-wastefulness of Φt. This completes the proof of the Claim.
Note that by Remark 2, Φt is individually rational. Thus, by (1) and the Claim, for each
i ∈ N and each t ∈ Ti, ϕti(R) = ζti (R). Thus, ϕ(R) = ζ(R), which violates our assumption that
ζ(R) dom(R) ϕ(R). Therefore, there exists i ∈ N satisfying (lem2-1).
Next, let i ∈ N and t0 ∈ Ti be such that ζt0i (R) P t0i ϕt0i (R) P t0i ot0 . We show that there exists
a preference R￿i ∈ Di which satisfies (lem2-2). First, we define a list of type preferences (R˜￿ti )t∈Ti .
In words, (R˜￿ti )t∈Ti is obtained from (R
t
i)t∈Ti by changing the ranking of o
t0 just above ϕt0i (R) while
the relative rankings of any other objects stay the same. Formally, (R˜￿ti )t∈Ti is defined as follows;
• [∀t ∈ Ti\{t0}, R˜￿ti = Rti] and R˜￿t0i |(Xt0\{ot0})×(Xt0\{ot0}) = Rt0i |(Xt0\{ot0})×(Xt0\{ot0}),
• ot0 P˜ ￿t0i ϕt0i (R) and
• ￿ ∃xt0 ∈ X t0\{ot0 ,ϕt0i (R)} s.t. ot0 R˜￿t0i xt0 R˜￿t0i ϕt0i (R).
By applying Lemma 1 for (R˜￿ti )t∈Ti and ζi(R), we can choose a preference R
￿
i ∈ Padd(Xi) such that
∀xi ∈ Xi, [{∃t ∈ Ti s.t. xti ∈ SLC(R￿ti , ζti (R))}⇒ ζi(R) P ￿i xi]. (2)
By (lem2-1) and the construction of (R￿ti )t∈Ti , B(R
￿
i) < B(Ri). Therefore, B(R
￿
i;R−i) < B(R).
Since R￿i ∈ Padd(Xi), I(R￿i;R−i) ≤ I(R).
Finally, we show (lem2-3). Since Φt0 is strategy-proof and individually rational, Φt0i (R
￿t0
i ;R
t0
−i) =
ot0 . Note that since ot0 ∈ SLC(R￿t0i , ζt0i (R)), by (2), we have ζi(R) P ￿i ϕi(R￿i;R−i). Thus, by
strategy-proofness of ζ, ζi(R￿i;R−i) P
￿
i ϕi(R
￿
i;R−i). Since ζ dom ϕ, we are done.
Next we present Lemma 3. It tells us how we transit from a profile if the coordinate-wise
weak domination does not occur in the profile. Item (lem3-2) is needed to terminate the induction
process in Lemma 4 in a finite number of steps, and it is also needed to prove Item (ii) in Lemma
4, which is also a trick to prove that two sequences in the proof of Theorem 1 satisfies (seq-ii).
Item (lem3-3) guarantees that the induction argument in Lemma 4 bites.
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To prove Lemma 3, we need a class of preferences. Let Σ(Ti) be the set of bijections from
{1, · · · , |Ti|} to Ti. A preference Ri ∈ R(Xi) is lexicographic if there are σ ∈ Σ(Ti) and list
of type preferences (Rti)t∈Ti ∈
￿
t∈Ti P(X t) such that for each pair of bundles {xi, x￿i} ⊆ Xi with
xi ￿= x￿i,
xi Ri x
￿
i ⇔ xσ(1)i P σ(1)i x￿σ(1)i or
￿
∃t ∈ {1, · · · , |Ti|}\{1} s.t.{∀t￿ < t, xσ(t￿)i = x￿σ(t
￿)
i } and xσ(t)i P σ(t)i x￿σ(t)i
￿
.
We denote by Plex(Xi) the set of all lexicographic preferences on Xi. It is easy to show that
Plex(Xi) ⊆ Padd(Xi).41
Lemma 3. Suppose that a rule ϕ is independent and for each t ∈ T , Φt : P(X t)Nt → At is
strategy-proof. Suppose also that a strategy-proof rule ζ dominates ϕ. Let R ∈ D. If R does not
satisfy the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, and not ζ(R) cw-dom(R) ϕ(R), then there exist i ∈ N and
R￿i ∈ Di such that
(lem3-1) Ri ￿∈ P(Xi),
(lem3-2) I(R￿i;R−i) < I(R) and B(R
￿
i;R−i) ≤ B(R), and
(lem3-3) ζ(R￿i;R−i) dom(R
￿
i;R−i) ϕ(R
￿
i;R−i).
Proof. First, we show that there exists i ∈ N satisfying (lem3-1). Since not ζ(R) cw-dom(R) ϕ(R),
there exist i ∈ N and t0 ∈ Ti such that ϕt0i (R) P t0i ζt0i (R). Thus, since R does not satisfy the (ζ,ϕ)-
reverse property, we have ϕi(R) Ri ζi(R). Since ζ dom ϕ, ϕi(R) Ii ζi(R). Since ϕi(R) ￿= ζi(R), we
obtain that Ri ￿∈ P(Xi), i.e., (lem3-1).
Next we choose R￿i ∈ Di as follows. By Assumption 2, Ri ∈Radd (Xi). Let (uti)t∈Ti ∈
￿
t∈Ti U t
be a list of type-utility functions which represents Ri. Since u
t0
i (ϕ
t0
i (R)) > u
t0
i (ζ
t0
i (R)) and￿
t∈Ti u
t
i(ϕ
t
i(R)) =
￿
t∈Ti u
t
i(ζ
t
i (R)), there exists t1 ∈ Ti such that ut1i (ζt1i (R)) > ut1i (ϕt1i (R)), i.e.,
41
Proof of Plex(Xi) ⊆ Padd(Xi). Let Ri ∈ Plex(Xi). Suppose that Ri is characterized by σ ∈ Σ(Ti) and (Rti)t∈Ti ∈￿
t∈Ti P(Xt). Assume, without loss of generality, that Ti = T and σ is the identity mapping, and (Rti)t∈T is such
that
R1i R
2
i · · · R|T |i
x11 x21 x|T |1
x12 x22 x|T |2
...
... · · · ...
x1K1 x2K2 x|T |K|T |
where for each t ∈ T , Kt := |Xt|. Let K :=
￿
t∈T Kt. Now we define (u
t
i)t∈T ∈ Πt∈TU t as follows:
u1i (x
11) = 10K−1 u2i (x21) = 10K−K1−1 u
|T |
i (x
|T |1) = 10K−
￿|T |−1
t=1 Kt−1
u1i (x
12) = 10K−2 u2i (x22) = 10K−K1−2 u
|T |
i (x
|T |2) = 10K−
￿|T |−1
t=1 Kt−2
...
... · · · ...
u1i (x
1K1) = 10K−K1 u2i (x2K2) = 10K−(K1+K2) u
|T |
i (x
|T |K|T |) = 10K−
￿|T |
t=1Kt .
Obviously, for each {yi, zi} ⊆ Xi, yi Ri zi if and only if
￿
t∈T u
t
i(y
t
i) ≥
￿
t∈T u
t
i(z
t
i). Thus Ri ∈ Padd(Xi).
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ζt1i (R) P
t1
i ϕ
t1
i (R). Now we change the preference of agent i. Let (R
￿t
i )t∈Ti := (R
t
i)t∈Ti and σ ∈ Σ(Ti)
be such that σ(1) = t1. Let R￿i ∈ Plex(Xi) be the lexicographic preference defined by σ and (R￿ti )t∈Ti
(See Remark 1). Obviously, I(R￿i;R−i) < I(R) and B(R
￿
i;R−i) = B(R). Thus, Item (3-2) is satis-
fied.
Finally we show (lem3-3). First, since ϕ is independent and R￿t1i = R
t1
i , ϕ
t1
i (R
￿
i;R−i) = ϕ
t1
i (R).
Second, since ζ is strategy-proof, ζi(R￿i;R−i) R
￿
i ζi(R). Third, since R
￿
i is a lexicographic preference
whose first priority is assigned to t1, we have ζ
t1
i (R
￿
i;R−i) R
￿t1
i ζ
t1
i (R). Therefore, since ζ
t1
i (R) P
t1
i
ϕt1i (R) and R
￿t1
i = R
t1
i , we have ζ
t1
i (R
￿
i;R−i) R
￿t1
i ζ
t1
i (R) P
￿t1
i ϕ
t1
i (R) = ϕ
t1
i (R
￿
i;R−i). Since R
￿
i is a
lexicographic preference whose first priority is on t1, ζi(R￿i;R−i) P
￿
i ϕi(R
￿
i;R−i). Since ζ dom ϕ, we
are done.
The following lemma is the realization of the transition process we employ. Item (i) is the
trick we need when we prove the two resulting sequences of non-negative integers in the proof
of Theorem 1 meet the condition (seq-ii). Item (ii) is also a trick used to prove the condition
(seq-ii). Item (iii) asserts that the transition process finally reaches a profile which satisfies the
(ζ,ϕ)-reverse property.
Lemma 4. Suppose that a rule ϕ is independent and for each t ∈ T , Φt : P(X t)Nt → At is strategy-
proof and non-wasteful. Suppose also that a strategy-proof rule ζ dominates ϕ. Let R(0) ∈ D be
such that ζ(R(0)) dom(R0) ϕ(R(0)). If R(0) does not satisfy the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, then there
exists a finite sequence of agent-preference pairs {(j(￿), R(￿)
j(￿)
)}L￿=1 satisfying the following conditions
(i), (ii) and (iii). For each ￿ = 1, · · · , L, let R(￿) := (R(￿)
j(￿)
;R(￿−1)−j(￿) ).
(i) ∀￿ = 1, · · · , L, ￿{∃t ∈ Tj(￿) s.t. |SUC(R(￿−1)tj(￿) , ot)| ≥ 2} or R(￿−1)j(￿) ￿∈ P(Xj(￿))￿
(ii) B(R(0)) ≥ B(R(1)) ≥ · · · ≥ B(R(L)), and
(iii) R(L) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property.
Proof. We inductively construct a sequence.
Step 1: If ζ(R(0)) cw-dom(R(0)) ϕ(R(0)), then by Lemma 2, there exist j(1) ∈ N and R(1)
j(1)
∈ Dj(1)
satisfying (lem2-1), (lem2-2) and (lem2-3). If not, then by Lemma 3, there exist j(1) ∈ N and
R(1)
j(1)
∈ Dj(1) satisfying (lem3-1), (lem3-2) and (lem3-3). Then, by (lem2-1) or (lem3-1), {there
is t ∈ Tj(1) s.t. |SUC(R(0)tj(1) , ot)| ≥ 2} or R(0)j(1) ￿∈ P(Xj(1)). Moreover, by (lem2-2) or (lem3-2),
B(R(0)) ≥ B(R(1)). Therefore, if R(1) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, then (j(1), R(1)
j(1)
) is the
desired sequence with its length 1. If R(1) does not satisfy the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, then go to
the next step. Note that by (lem2-3) or (lem3-3), ζ(R(1)) dom(R(1)) ϕ(R(1)). 42
Step ￿ (≥ 2): If ζ(R(￿−1)) cw-dom(R(￿−1)) ϕ(R(￿−1)), then by Lemma 2, there exist j(￿) ∈ N and
R(￿)
j(￿)
∈ Dj(￿) satisfying (lem2-1), (lem2-2) and (lem2-3). If not, then by Lemma 3, there ex-
ist j(￿) ∈ N and R(￿)
j(￿)
∈ Dj(￿) satisfying (lem3-1), (lem3-2) and (lem3-3). Then, by (lem2-1)
or (lem3-1), {there is t ∈ Tj(￿) s.t. |SUC(R(￿−1)tj(￿) , ot)| ≥ 2} or R(￿−1)j(￿) ￿∈ P(Xj(￿)). Moreover, by
(lem2-2) or (lem3-2), B(R(￿−1)) ≥ B(R(￿)). Therefore, if R(￿) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property,
42Therefore, the induction argument bites.
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then (j(1), R(1)
j(1)
), · · · , (j(￿), R(￿)
j(￿)
) is the desired sequence with its length ￿. If R(￿) does not sat-
isfy the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, then go to the next step. Note that by (lem2-3) or (lem3-3),
ζ(R(￿)) dom(R(￿)) ϕ(R(￿)).
We claim that the above procedure stops in a finite number of steps, i.e., there exists L ≥ 1
such that R(L) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property. Since in each step ￿, by (lem2-2) or (lem3-2),
[B(R(￿−1)) ≥ B(R(￿)) and I(R(￿−1)) ≥ I(R(￿))] and [B(R(￿−1)) > B(R(￿)) or I(R(￿−1)) > I(R(￿))].
Since B(R(0)) and I(R(0)) are non-negative integers, the procedure cannot have infinite steps.
Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose to the contrary that a strategy-proof rule ζ dominates ϕ. Let R(1,0) ∈ D be such that
ζ(R(1,0)) dom(R(1,0)) ϕ(R(1,0)). Let b(1,0) := ζ(R(1,0)) and a(1,0) := ϕ(R(1,0)). Let N (0) := |N | and
B(1) := B(R(1,0)). We will inductively construct two infinite sequences of non-negative integers
{N (k)}∞k=0 and {B(k)}∞k=1 that cause a contradiction.
Induction step 1. If R(1,0) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, then let L1 := 0. If R(1,0) does not,
then by Lemma 4, there exists a finite sequence of agent-preference pairs {(j(1,￿), R(1,￿)
j(1,￿)
)}L1￿=1 satis-
fying the following (1-i), (1-ii) and (1-iii), where for each ￿ ∈ {1, · · · , L1}, R(1,￿) := (R(1,￿)j(1,￿) ;R(1,￿−1)−j(1,￿) ).
(1-i) ∀￿ = 1, · · · , L1,
￿{∃t ∈ Tj(1,￿) s.t. |SUC(R(1,￿−1)tj(1,￿) , ot)| ≥ 2} or R(1,￿−1)j(1,￿) ￿∈ P(Xj(1,￿))￿,
(1-ii) B(R(1,0)) ≥ B(R(1,1)) ≥ · · · ≥ B(R(1,L1)), and
(1-iii) R(1,L1) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property.
For each ￿ ∈ {1, · · · , L1}, let b(1,￿) := ζ(R(1,￿)) and a(1,￿) := ϕ(R(1,￿)).
Since R(1,L1) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property,
∃i(1) ∈ N s.t. ￿b(1,L1)
i(1)
P (1,L1)
i(1)
a(1,L1)
i(1)
and {∃t ∈ Ti(1) s.t. a(1,L1)ti(1) P (1,L1)ti(1) b(1,L1)ti(1) }
￿
. A(1)
Let N (1) := |N\{i(1)}|. Now, we change the agent i(1)’s preference. Let (R˜(2,0)t
i(1)
)t∈T
i(1)
be a list
of type preferences satisfying the (1∗ − i) below. By applying Lemma 1 for (R˜(2,0)t
i(1)
)t∈T
i(1)
and
(ot)t∈T
i(1)
, we obtain a preference R(2,0)
i(1)
∈ Padd(Xi(1)) with (R(2,0)ti(1) )t∈Ti(1) = (R˜
(2,0)t
i(1)
)t∈T
i(1)
satisfying
(1∗ − ii).
(1∗-i) ∀t ∈ Ti(1) , ∀xt ∈ X t\{b(1,L1)ti(1) , ot}, b(1,L1)ti(1) R˜(2,0)ti(1) ot P˜ (2,0)ti(1) xt and
(1∗-ii) ∀xi(1) ∈ Xi(1) ,
￿{∃t ∈ Ti(1) s.t. xti(1) ∈ SLC(R(2,0)ti(1) , ot)}⇒ (ot)t∈Ti(1) P (2,0)i(1) xi(1)￿.
Let R(2,0) := (R(2,0)
i(1)
;R(1,L1)−i(1) ), b
(2,0) := ζ(R(2,0)), a(2,0) := ϕ(R(2,0)) and B(2) := B(R(2,0)).
Claim 1.1. b(2,0) dom(R(2,0)) a(2,0).
We show b(2,0)
i(1)
P (2,0)
i(1)
a(2,0)
i(1)
. Suppose to the contrary that b(2,0)
i(1)
= a(2,0)
i(1)
. 43 Since ζ is strategy-
proof, b(2,0)
i(1)
= ζi(1)(R
(2,0)) R(2,0)
i(1)
ζi(1)(R
(1,L1)) = b(1,L1)
i(1)
. Note that by (1∗-i) and the separability
43Note that R(2,0)
i(1)
is strict.
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of R(2,0)
i(1)
, b(1,L1)
i(1)
is a best bundle at R(2,0)
i(1)
. Thus, since R(2,0)
i(1)
is strict, b(2,0)
i(1)
= b(1,L1)
i(1)
. Thus,
a(2,0)
i(1)
= b(1,L1)
i(1)
. Hence, by A(1), ϕi(1)(R
(2,0)) = a(2,0)
i(1)
= b(1,L1)
i(1)
P (1,L1)
i(1)
a(1,L1)
i(1)
= ϕi(1)(R
(1,L1)), a
violation of strategy-proofness of ϕ. Therefore, b(2,0)
i(1)
P (2,0)
i(1)
a(2,0)
i(1)
. Since ζ dom ϕ, this completes
the proof of Claim 1.1.
The following claim trivially holds since N (0) > N (1).
Claim 1.2. N (0) = N (1) ⇒ B(1) > B(2).
Now, let k ≥ 2.
Induction hypothesis. Suppose that the series of statements below are true for each k￿ < k. If
{(j(k￿,￿), R(k￿,￿)
j(k￿,￿))}
Lk￿
￿=1 is not defined, Lk￿ = 0. If {(j(k￿,￿), R(k
￿,￿)
j(k￿,￿))}
Lk￿
￿=1 is defined, then it satisfies the
following (k’-i), (k’-ii) and (k’-iii), where for each ￿ ∈ {1, · · · , Lk￿}, R(k￿,￿) := (R(k￿,￿)j(k￿,￿) ;R
(k￿,￿−1)
−j(k￿,￿) ).
(k’-i) ∀￿ = 1, · · · , Lk￿ ,
￿{∃t ∈ Tj(k￿,￿) s.t. |SUC(R(k￿,￿−1)tj(k￿,￿) , ot)| ≥ 2} or R(k￿,￿−1)j(k￿,￿) ￿∈ P(Xj(k￿,￿))￿,
(k’-ii) B(R(k
￿,0)) ≥ B(R(k￿,1)) ≥ · · · ≥ B(R(k￿,Lk￿ )), and
(k’-iii) R(k
￿,Lk￿ ) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property.
For each ￿ = 1, · · · , Lk￿ , let b(k￿,￿) := ζ(R(k￿,￿)) and a(k￿,￿) := ϕ(R(k￿,￿)). For agent i(k￿) ∈ N ,￿
b
(k￿,Lk￿ )
i(k￿) P
(k￿,Lk￿ )
i(k￿) a
(k￿,Lk￿ )
i(k￿) and {∃t ∈ Ti(k￿) s.t. a
(k￿,Lk￿ )t
i(k￿) P
(k￿,Lk￿ )t
i(k￿) b
(k￿,Lk￿ )t
i(k￿) }
￿
. A(k’)
Let N (k
￿) := |N\{i(1), · · · , i(k￿)}|. For agent i(k￿)’s new preference R(k￿+1,0)
i(k￿) ∈ Padd(Xi(k￿)),
(k’∗-i) ∀t ∈ Ti(k￿) , ∀xt ∈ X t\{b(k
￿,Lk￿ )t
i(k￿) , o
t}, b(k￿,Lk￿ )t
i(k￿) R
(k￿+1,0)t
i(k￿) o
t P (k
￿+1,0)t
i(k￿) x
t, and
(k’∗-ii) ∀xi(k￿) ∈ Xi(k￿) ,
￿{∃t ∈ Ti(k￿) s.t. xti(k￿) ∈ SLC(R(k￿+1,0)ti(k￿) , ot)}⇒ (ot)t∈Ti(k￿) P (k￿+1,0)i(k￿) xi(k￿)￿.
LettingR(k
￿+1,0) := (R(k
￿+1,0)
i(k￿) ;R
(k￿,Lk￿ )
−i(k￿) ), b
(k￿+1,0) := ζ(R(k
￿+1,0)), a(k
￿+1,0) := ϕ(R(k
￿+1,0)) andB(k
￿+1) :=
B(R(k
￿+1,0)).
Claim k’.1. b(k
￿+1,0) dom(R(k
￿+1,0)) a(k
￿+1,0), and
Claim k’.2. N (k
￿−1) = N (k￿) ⇒ B(k￿) > B(k￿+1).
Induction step k. If R(k,0) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, then let Lk := 0. If R(k,0) does not,
then by Lemma 4, there exists a finite sequence of agent-preference pairs {(j(k,￿), R(k,￿)
j(k,￿)
)}Lk￿=1 satis-
fying the following (k-i), (k-ii) and (k-iii), where for each ￿ = 1, · · · , Lk, R(k,￿) := (R(k,￿)j(k,￿) ;R(k,￿−1)−j(k,￿) ).
(k-i) ∀￿ = 1, · · · , Lk,
￿{∃t ∈ Tj(k,￿) s.t. |SUC(R(k,￿−1)tj(k,￿) , ot)| ≥ 2} or R(k,￿−1)j(k,￿) ￿∈ P(Xj(k,￿))￿,
(k-ii) B(R(k,0)) ≥ B(R(k,1)) ≥ · · · ≥ B(R(k,Lk)), and
(k-iii) R(k,Lk) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property.
For each ￿ = 1, · · · , Lk, let b(k,￿) := ζ(R(k,￿)) and a(k,￿) := ϕ(R(k,￿)). Since R(k,Lk) satisfies the
(ζ,ϕ)-reverse property,
∃i(k) ∈ N s.t. ￿b(k,Lk)
i(k)
P (k,Lk)
i(k)
a(k,Lk)
i(k)
and {∃t ∈ Ti(k) s.t. a(k,Lk)ti(k) P (k,Lk)ti(k) b(k,Lk)ti(k) }
￿
. A(k)
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Let N (k) := |N\{i(1), · · · , i(k)}|. Now, we change the agent i(k)’s preference. Let (R˜(k+1,0)t
i(k)
)t∈T
i(k)
be
a list of type preferences satisfying the (k∗ − i) below. By applying Lemma 1 for (R˜(k+1,0)t
i(k)
)t∈T
i(k)
and (ot)t∈T
i(k)
, we obtain a preference R(k+1,0)
i(k)
∈ Padd(Xi(k)) with (R(k+1,0)ti(k) )t∈Ti(k) = (R˜
(k+1,0)t
i(k)
)t∈T
i(k)
satisfying (k∗ − ii).
(k∗-i) ∀t ∈ Ti(k) , ∀xt ∈ X t\{b(k,Lk)ti(k) , ot}, b(k,Lk)ti(k) R˜(k+1,0)ti(k) ot P˜ (k+1,0)ti(k) xt and
(k∗-ii) ∀xi(k) ∈ Xi(k) ,
￿{∃t ∈ Ti(k) s.t. xti(k) ∈ SLC(R(k+1,0)ti(k) , ot)}⇒ (ot)t∈Ti(k) P (k+1,0)i(k) xi(k)￿.
Let R(k+1,0) := (R(k+1,0)
i(k)
;R(k,Lk)−i(k) ), b
(k+1,0) := ζ(R(k+1,0)), a(k+1,0) := ϕ(R(k+1,0)) and B(k+1) :=
B(R(k+1,0)).
Claim k.1. b(k+1,0) dom(R(k+1,0)) a(k+1,0).
We show that b(k+1,0)
i(k)
P (k+1,0)
i(k)
a(k+1,0)
i(k)
. Suppose to the contrary that b(k+1,0)
i(k)
= a(k+1,0)
i(k)
. 44
Since ζ is strategy-proof, b(k+1,0)
i(k)
= ζi(k)(R
(k+1,0)) R(k+1,0)
i(k)
ζi(k)(R
(k,Lk)) = b(k,Lk)
i(k)
. Note that by
(k∗-i) and the separability of R(k+1,0)
i(k)
, b(k,Lk)
i(k)
is a best bundle at R(k+1,0)
i(k)
. Since R(k+1,0)
i(k)
is strict,
b(k+1,0)
i(k)
= b(k,Lk)
i(k)
. Thus, a(k+1,0)
i(k)
= b(k,Lk)
i(k)
. Hence, by A(k), ϕi(k)(R
(k+1,0)) = a(k+1,0)
i(k)
= b(k,Lk)
i(k)
P (k,Lk)
i(k)
a(k,Lk)
i(k)
= ϕi(k)(R
(k,Lk)), a violation of strategy-proofness of ϕ. Therefore, b(k+1,0)
i(k)
P (k+1,0)
i(k)
a(k+1,0)
i(k)
.
Since ζ dom ϕ, this completes the proof of Claim k.1.
Claim k.2. N (k−1) = N (k) ⇒ B(k) > B(k+1).
Suppose that N (k−1) = N (k), i.e., i(k) ∈ {i(1), · · · , i(k−1)}. Let k￿ be the largest integer with
k￿ < k such that i(k￿) = i(k). First, we claim that the preference replacement from R(k,Lk)
i(k)
to R(k+1,0)
i(k)
is the first opportunity to change i(k)(= i(k
￿))’s preference after we have chosen R(k
￿+1,0)
i(k￿) . Formally,
Claim k.2.1. R(k,Lk)
i(k)
= R(k
￿+1,0)
i(k￿) .
Suppose R(k,Lk)
i(k)
￿= R(k￿+1,0)
i(k￿) . By definition of k
￿,
∃k￿￿ ∈ {k￿ + 1, · · · , k}, ∃￿ ∈ {1, · · · , Lk￿￿} s.t. i(k￿) = j(k￿￿,￿). 45
Let (k￿￿, ￿) be the first index in which i(k￿) = j(k￿￿,￿). 46 However, by the condition (k”-i),
{∃t ∈ Tj(k￿￿,￿) s.t. |SUC(R(k
￿￿,￿−1)t
j(k￿￿,￿) , o
t)| ≥ 2} or R(k￿￿,￿−1)
j(k￿￿,￿) ￿∈ P(Xj(k￿￿,￿))
while R(k
￿+1,0)
i(k￿) (= R
(k￿￿,￿−1)
j(k￿￿,￿) ) belongs to P(Xi(k￿)), and satisfies the condition (k￿∗-i) which
asserts that for each t ∈ Ti(k￿) , |SUC(R(k
￿+1,0)t
i(k￿) , o
t)| ≤ 1, a contradiction. This completes
the proof of Claim k.2.1.
The next claim asserts that for each t ∈ Ti(k) , the type-t obeject at b(k,Lk)i(k) is at least as good as the
type-t outside option for agent i(k) according to R(k,Lk)
i(k)
.
44Note that R(k+1,0)
i(k)
is strict.
45In words, the preference replacement is accompanied by the application of Lemma 4 in step k￿￿ after k￿.
46Namely, k￿￿ is the smallest first coordinate among the pairs satisfying the condition, and ￿ is the smallest second
coordinate among the pairs in which the first coordinate is k￿￿ satisfying the condition.
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Claim k.2.2. ∀t ∈ Ti(k) , b(k,Lk)ti(k) R(k,Lk)ti(k) ot.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists t ∈ Ti(k) such that ot P (k,Lk)ti(k) b(k,Lk)ti(k) . By
Claim k.2.1., R(k,Lk)
i(k)
= R(k
￿+1,0)
i(k￿) . Thus, by the condition (k
￿∗-ii), (ot)t∈T
i(k)
P (k,Lk)
i(k)
b(k,Lk)
i(k)
= ζi(k)(R
(k,Lk)). Thus, ζ is not individually rational. However, since ζ dom ϕ,
ζ is individually rational, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim
k.2.2.
Now, we turn back to the proof of Claim k.2. By the condition A(k) and Claim k.2.2., there
is t ∈ Ti(k) such that a(k,Lk)ti(k) P (k,Lk)ti(k) b(k,Lk)ti(k) R(k,Lk)ti(k) ot. Thus, B(R(k,Lk)ti(k) ) > B(R(k+1,0)ti(k) ). Note
that by (k∗-1) and Claim k.2.2., for each t￿ ∈ Ti(k)\{t}, B(R(k,Lk)t
￿
i(k)
) ≥ B(R(k+1,0)t￿
i(k)
). Summing up,
we have B(R(k,Lk)
i(k)
) > B(R(k+1,0)
i(k)
). Thus, B(R(k,Lk)) > B(R(k+1,0)) since i(k)’s preference is the
only diﬀerence between R(k,Lk) and R(k+1,0). By the condition (k-ii), B(R(k,0)) ≥ · · · ≥ B(R(k,Lk)).
Therefore, B(k) = B(R(k,0)) > B(R(k+1,0)) = B(k+1). This completes the proof of Claim k.2.
We have inductively defined two sequences {N (k)}∞k=0 and {B(k)}∞k=1 of non-negative integers.
Obviously, {N (k)}∞k=0 is weakly decreasing, i.e., N (0) > N (1) ≥ · · ·N (k) ≥ · · · . We show that
∀k ∈ N, ∃k￿ > k s.t. N (k) > N (k￿). (3)
Let k ∈ N be arbitrary. Let K := 1 + B(k+1) and k￿ := k + K. We prove by contradiction that
N (k) > N (k
￿). If N (k) = N (k+1) = · · · = N (k+K), then by Claims k.2 to (k+K-1).2., we can conclude
that B(k+1) > B(k+2) > · · · > B(k+K+1). This implies 0 > B(k+K+1), a contradiction. Thus, (3)
holds. However, N (0) is a finite non-negative number, a contradiction. This completes the proof
of Theorem 1. ￿
Proof of Corollary 3
Next we prove Corollary 3. We begin with three lemmas.
Lemma 5. Suppose that ϕ is independent, and for each t ∈ T , Φt : P(X t)Nt → At is strategy-proof
and Pareto eﬃcient. Suppose also that a strategy-proof rule ζ dominates ϕ. Then, for each R ∈ D,
if ζ(R) dom ϕ(R), then ζ(R) does not coordinate-wise weakly dominate ϕ(R) at R.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that ζ(R) cw-dom(R) ϕ(R). Since ζ(R) dom(R) ϕ(R), there
exists i ∈ N such that ζi(R) Pi ϕi(R). Since Ri is separable, there exists t ∈ Ti such that ζti (R) P ti
ϕti(R) = Φ
t
i(R
t). Since ζ(R) cw-dom(R) ϕ(R), for each j ∈ N t\{i}, ζtj(R) Rtj ϕtj(R) = Φtj(Rt).
This violates that Φt(Rt) is Pareto eﬃcient at Rt.
Lemma 6. Suppose that ϕ is independent and for each t ∈ T , Φt : P(X t)Nt → At is strategy-proof
and Pareto eﬃcient. Suppose also that a strategy-proof rule ζ dominates ϕ. Let R ∈ D be such
that ζ(R) dom(R) ϕ(R). If R does not satisfy the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property, then there exist i ∈ N
and R￿i ∈ Di such that
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(lem6-1) Ri ￿∈ P(Xi),
(lem6-2) I(R￿i;R−i) < I(R) and (R
￿t
i )t∈Ti = (R
t
i)t∈Ti, and
(lem6-3) ζ(R￿i;R−i) dom(R
￿
i;R−i) ϕ(R
￿
i;R−i).
Proof. Same as the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 7. Suppose that a rule ϕ is independent and for each t ∈ T , Φt : P(X t)Nt → At is
strategy-proof and Pareto eﬃcient. Suppose also that a strategy-proof rule ζ dominates ϕ. Let
R(0) ∈ D be such that ζ(R(0)) dom(R0) ϕ(R(0)). If R(0) does not satisfy the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property,
then there exists a finite sequence of agent-preference pairs {(j(￿), R(￿)
j(￿)
)}L￿=1 satisfying the following
conditions (i), (ii) and (iii). For each ￿ = 1, · · · , L, let R(￿) := (R(￿)
j(￿)
;R(￿−1)−j(￿) ).
(i) ∀￿ = 1, · · · , L, R(￿−1)
j(￿)
￿∈ P(Xj(￿)),
(ii) ∀￿ = 1, · · · , L, (R(￿)t
j(￿)
)t∈T
j(￿)
= (R(￿−1)t
j(￿)
)t∈T
j(￿)
and
(iii) R(L) satisfies the (ζ,ϕ)-reverse property.
Proof. Same as the proof of Lemma 4.
We introduce notations: For each i ∈ N , each t ∈ Ti, each Rti ∈ P(X t), each Ri ∈ Di and each
R ∈ D, let Bω(Rti) := |SUC(Rti,ωti)|, Bω(Ri) :=
￿
t∈Ti B
ω(Rti), and B
ω(R) :=
￿
i∈N B
ω(Ri). The
operator Bω assigns the number of object(s) which are preferred to the endowed object(s). Now
we are ready to prove Corollary 3.
Proof of Corollary 3
Replacing B in the proof of Theorem 1 with Bω, the same proof as that for Theorem 1 works,
where for each i ∈ N , ωi plays the role of (ot)t∈Ti in the proof of Theorem 1. ￿
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